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There Is Nothing Light About Feathers:
Finding Form in the Jurisprudence of
Native American Religious Exemptions
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment’s protection of religious freedom is among the
most cherished, most fundamental, and most debated facets of modern
American constitutional law. 1 The Amendment and the often fierce
debate surrounding its reach are colored by deeply rooted American
traditions of faith and spirituality. For example, the first permanent
European settlers in America braved the Atlantic for the express purpose
of finding religious freedom—truly leaving a legacy of faith. 2 Their faith
and their presence in North America, however, were preceded by the first
Americans, the Indians, 3 whose spirituality was not only a religion, but a

1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1947) (“A large proportion of the early
settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them
to support and attend government-favored churches.”) Ironically, the early settlers, with chartered
authority of the English Crown, created government sponsored religious establishments that all were
required to both attend and give financial support. Id. at 9. By 1619, the Virginia legislature had
passed laws providing governmental support of the Anglican clergy. See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF RELIGION IN AMERICA TO 1877, at 58 (Edwin S. Gaustad & Mark A. Noll eds., 3d ed. 2003). The
practice of governmental establishment of religion came to be abhorred and inspired the indignation
that led to the First Amendment. See SWEET, supra at 11–12. Nevertheless, the First Amendment
was not applied against the states until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Permoli v.
Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 609 (1845) (“The Constitution makes no provision
for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in
this respect on the states.”). But see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable against the states).
3. When Christopher Columbus arrived in the Americas, believing he had reached the East
Indies, he called the native people “Indians.” See ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN’S
INDIAN 4–5 (1979) (indicating that the term “Indian” denotes any native inhabitant of North or South
America and was casually coined by Christopher Columbus who mistakenly believed he had landed
in the East Indies, islands off the coast of Asia). Throughout this Comment, the aboriginal people of
North America will be referred to as Indians, American Indians, or Native Americans.
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way of life. 4 And while the Native American legacy has the suggestive
tincture of religion, the heart of Indian spirituality is not adherence to a
strict doctrine, but is, rather, a profound cultural “reverence for nature
and for life.” 5
Both legacies have enriched the American cultural landscape.
However, the treatment of Native Americans and the protections
afforded them have not historically been consistent with the general
treatment of non-Indians. 6 One of the principal questions that arises in
this context is whether the tribal cultural identity and the Indian system
of ancient beliefs and indigenous spiritual values can be “reconciled with
the subsequently introduced system of individuals rights intended to
protect the most cherished liberties supposedly belonging to all United
States citizens.” 7 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the current
debate surrounding special Indian religious exemptions to federal laws
protecting bald and golden eagles. 8 In adopting and amending the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”), 9 Congress created an
express Native American religious exemption to the general prohibition
on the use and possession of eagles and eagle parts (i.e., feathers, talons,
etc.). 10 However, the exemption has been interpreted and administered
such that it applies only to those practicing the Native American religion

4. See, e.g., G. Peter Jemison, The Journey, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 433, 435 (1995) (“Our
religion [referring to the Seneca Tribe] and our government are entwined as one; we do not separate
them and we do not call it religion. Rather it is an Indian way of life that encompasses everything
that we do.”); Deward E. Walker Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography, in
HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Christopher Vescey ed., 1991).
5. See JOSEPH EPES BROWN, SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 37 (1982),
quoted in Robert Charles Ward, The Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and Destruction
of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 801 n.28 (1992).
6. The simple truth is that treatment of Native Americans has been widely disparate, ranging
from official governmental policies calling for their destruction or assimilation, to the current policy
of self-determination. The historical treatment of American Indians is not the substance of a familyfriendly film, but rather reveals a sorry tale of war, maltreatment, discrimination, broken promises,
and the destruction, or nearly so, of peoples and cultures that had endured centuries of independent
existence.
7. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 739 (5th
ed. 2005).
8. Particularly, this issue arises in the context of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1538, 1540 (2000); the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”), id. § 668(a);
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”), id. § 707(a).
9. Id. § 668.
10. Id.
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and who are not only Indian by blood but also members of federally
recognized Tribes. 11
This special treatment has led to a variety of constitutional
challenges by Indians and non-Indians claiming violations of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as violations of the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 12 Under normal
constitutional analysis, the special treatment of one individual over
another because of race or religion would be patently unconstitutional
unless the preference is narrowly tailored to achieve some compelling
governmental interest. 13 However, if the preference or infringement of
free exercise is not the result of a facially discriminatory law, but rather
is the incidental effect of one that is generally applicable, the
Constitution requires only that the government have a rational basis for
its action. 14 When one further considers the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act 15 and intricacies of Federal Indian law, the discussion
becomes even more complicated.
Generally, if Congress were to create an express exemption or
preference for a specific religion, the act would violate the Establishment
Clause. 16 Indian Tribes, however, are unique in that they are both
political sovereigns and religious groups. Does this classification matter?
Are Indians nothing more than a political class, subject to the plenary
power of Congress? Are they not also a racial and religious minority,
beneficiaries of the protections of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment? How do considerations of Congress’s plenary power
over 17 and fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes 18 factor in? These
questions underlie the controversy over Indian religious exemptions to
generally applicable laws.
This Comment argues that there are legitimate reasons to treat
Indians differently and that Congress and the courts should honor both
11. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986); United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d
919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2002).
12. See cases listed supra note 11.
13. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990).
14. Id. at 878.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) [hereinafter RFRA]; see also Hardman, 297
F.3d at 1116, 1124.
16. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246–47 (1982); Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992).
17. See infra Part VII.A.
18. See infra Part VII.A.
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treaties and trust responsibilities, so far as it is legal and practicable.
However, the courts should develop a clear rule that distinguishes a
tribe’s political identity from its religious function; furthermore,
Congress should take steps to give more authority to the tribal political
entities in administering programs that have religious implications so as
to avoid even the appearance of excessive government entanglement
with religion. Specifically, tribes should have greater authority in
administering the Indian religious exemptions to the BGEPA because
they are uniquely qualified to determine who is or is not a member of
their respective tribes, who is or is not a sincere practitioner of the Native
American religion, and what is or is not a bona fide Native American
religious ceremony. Further, because eagle parts are in such limited
supply, tribes would be empowered to prioritize the needs of the tribe
and the tribal members, allowing them to distribute eagle parts in a way
that accommodates the most immediate needs first.
Part II of this Comment briefly reviews the evolving free exercise,
establishment clause and equal protection jurisprudence. Part III frames
the issues surrounding Native American free exercise, discussing the
interests of the key players: the federally recognized Indian tribes’
interest in sovereignty and cultural preservation, the federal
government’s interest in species conservation and in fulfilling its trust
responsibilities to the federally recognized tribes, and the interests of
individual non-Indians and Indians who are not members of federally
recognized tribes in freely practicing their sincere religious beliefs.
The discussion in Parts IV, V, and VI of the relevant case law
identifies a split in the circuit courts of appeals on whether the
government’s interest in protecting eagles is compelling enough to
justify discrimination. These parts also review several of the most recent
cases involving eagle feathers as tribal and religious symbols. Part VII
critically analyzes the rationale of these cases, reviewing the unique
position of Indian tribes in the American constitutional scheme and
attempting to discern any cogent and justifiable reason to create religious
exemptions for Indian tribes. While such exemptions are intended to
benefit Indian tribes, they may actually create a constitutional
conundrum that not only amounts to excessive government entanglement
in religion, but may actually result in harmful discrimination against
Indian tribes. To avoid these problems, Congress should adopt an arm’s
length oversight policy that creates general exemptions for Indian
cultural practices, ceding authority to the tribes to determine when and
under what circumstances a permit to use eagle parts is warranted. The
1578
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Comment concludes, in Part VIII, by arguing that there is a legitimate
basis for disparate treatment of Indian tribes and while honoring that
distinction, Congress and courts should be careful not to cast the issue in
terms of race or religion, but to make an honest attempt to treat tribes as
political sovereigns and allow them to control their own
cultural/religious destinies.
II. A CRASH COURSE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Central to the debate on Indian Religious exemptions is the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .” 19 The respective clauses apply to any act
of the Federal Government and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, to
the states. 20 Although the amendment is a limitation on Congress’s
power, its objective is to protect individual rights. In its most simple
application, the First Amendment guarantees at a minimum that the
government “may not coerce anyone to . . . participate in religion or its
exercise” 21 or otherwise act in such a way that “establishes a religion or
religious faith or tends to do so.” 22
The religious freedom protections are perhaps best conceptualized in
the notion of a “separation between church and state.” The phrase
allegedly originated in a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to members
of the Danbury Baptist Association. 23 In response to their kind and
religiously inspired words, Jefferson wrote,
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only,
& not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable against the states).
21. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
22. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984).
23. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted at Library of Congress, Thomas Jefferson’s Letters to
the
Danbury
Baptists
(June
1998),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/loc/
lcib/9806/danpre.html.
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“make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State. 24

A. Establishment Clause
In accord with Jefferson’s words, the Establishment Clause has been
interpreted to mean that neither the state nor the federal government may
establish a church or pass laws that aid or prefer one religion over
another. 25
To determine whether a law impermissibly establishes, aids, or
favors a religion, the Supreme Court announced a three-part test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 26 First, the law must have a “secular legislative
purpose.” 27 Second, the “principal or primary effect” of the law must not
be to advance or inhibit religious belief or practice. 28 And third, the
statute “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’” 29 Since the Lemon Test was announced, however, the Court
has found the test to be too abstract to be effective. As a result, the
Lemon test is seen as a device to generate fact specific rules to be more
precisely applied in distinct situations. 30 Nevertheless, the principles
announced by the Court in Lemon remain. 31
In applying the Lemon Test, the Supreme Court has determined that
while the Establishment Clause requires the separation of church and
state, it also affirmatively mandates religious accommodation, not merely

24. Id.
25. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)
(“[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”).
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Id. at 612.
28. Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
29. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
30. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY
ARGUMENTS 724–25 (2001).
31. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 388 (1983) (applying the Lemon Test). However, the
application of the Lemon Test has yielded some seemingly inconsistent results. See Robinson v. City
of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1201 (1996) (finding the
depiction of a cross on a city seal to violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test). But see
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1211 (1996) (finding
that statutes using the motto “In God We Trust” do not violate the Establishment Clause under the
Lemon test).
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tolerance. 32 In Zorach v. Clauson, 33 Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, said,
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make
room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of
man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
When the state . . . cooperates with religious authorities . . . it then
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be
to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe . . . . [W]e find no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to
be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen
the effective scope of religious influence. 34

This attitude of religious accommodation is not only a central issue in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but also extends to the area of free
exercise.
B. Free Exercise
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has been
interpreted to mean that the government cannot interfere with or attempt
to regulate a person’s religious beliefs, penalize a person for his or her
religious beliefs, or coerce a person to affirm any religious beliefs
contrary to his or her conscience. 35 Therefore, any law that intentionally
or expressly burdens either a person’s or a group’s fundamental right 36 to
free exercise of religion is unconstitutional. 37 Still, the government may
regulate religious activities in order to protect the safety, peace, good
32. The First Amendment reflects the philosophy that church and state should be separated.
“The First Amendment . . . does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
church and state. Rather, [the amendment] studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
33. Id. at 313–14.
34. Id.
35. See generally Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963).
36. A fundamental right is one that is implicitly or explicitly embodied in the Constitution.
See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
37. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990).
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order, and comfort of all members of society, so long as the regulations
are nondiscriminatory and reasonable. 38 However, the power to regulate
religious activities is not without limit. 39 Where a generally applicable
law interferes with religious exercise, in some instances, religious
exemptions may be granted in the interest of accommodating religious
exercise. 40
The practice of granting religious exemptions, however, has evolved
over time. Beginning with Reynolds v. United States 41 in 1878 and
extending until Sherbert v. Verner 42 in 1963, the Supreme Court
generally rejected claims that the Free Exercise Clause allowed religious
exemptions to generally applicable laws. But in Sherbert, the Court
granted a religious exemption under a state unemployment statute
because the state had recognized secular exemptions under that same
law. 43 In granting the judicial exemption, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to the government’s scheme of exemptions, requiring a
compelling state interest to justify why religious exemptions were
precluded while other secular exemptions were allowed. 44 What

38. See Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937, 938 (4th Cir. 1943).
39. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–78 (holding that laws infringing on religious freedom must be
facially neutral and generally applicable, and have a rational basis to meet a legitimate governmental
interest to avoid constitutional infirmity); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (government may not compel an affirmation of
religious belief); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–88 (1944) (government may not punish
the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631–32
(1978) (government may not impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (same); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–52 (1969) (government may not
lend its power to churches in controversies over religious authority).
40. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (granting constitutional or judicial religious exemption);
see also 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (giving authority to the U.S. Attorney General to promulgate rules
regulating “manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances”); 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31 (1989) (exempting the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the
Native American Church).
Whether such religious exemptions are good policy—or even constitutional under the
Establishment Clause—is the topic of significant academic debate. Compare Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1129
(1990), with William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308, 319 (1991).
41. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (refusing to create an exemption to the generally applicable law
regulating marriage).
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422–23 (creating a religious exemption to a generally applicable
unemployment law where the state had created secular exemptions under the law).
43. Id. at 408–09.
44. See id.
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followed was an era when even an incidental infringement of free
exercise compelled a strict scrutiny analysis. 45
Such analysis led the Supreme Court to grant another religious
exemption in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 46 In Yoder, despite a generally
applicable law requiring all children to attend public school through high
school, the Court held that an Amish family’s right to direct the
education of their child, coupled with a religious belief that drove them
to end their child’s public education after the eighth grade, outweighed
the state’s interest in promoting higher education. 47
In contrast, and particularly germane to this Comment, the Court
refused to create a similar exception in a case addressing incidental
effects of a generally applicable law on Native American religious
freedom. 48 In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, the Court rejected claims that a proposed logging road near
traditional Indian burial sites was an unreasonable burden on Native
American religion. 49 The Court reasoned that because the government
action was facially neutral, that is, not targeted at any religion, and did
not “coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs,” the
government did not have to show a compelling interest. 50
Lyng seemed to limit the possibility of judicially created exemptions
when a law is facially neutral and generally applicable. The Court’s 1990
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith 51 left no doubt as to this
limitation, establishing that when a law is facially neutral and generally
applicable, strict scrutiny is not required. 52 In that case, two members of
the Native American Church were fired from their jobs for using peyote
in a religious ceremony. 53 When they were denied unemployment
benefits, they brought suit, arguing that the state statute that prohibited
the use of peyote infringed on their religious freedom and that they
should be granted a religious exemption. 54 In rejecting their claim, the
Court generally rejected the model established by Sherbert v. Verner of
45.
(1993).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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judicially creating exemptions, returning instead to a model of allowing
only those statutory exemptions created by positive act of the legislative
body.
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). 55 Under the Act, Congress attempted
to restore the strict scrutiny of the compelling interest test in free exercise
cases. 56 Congress purported to restore the model of judicial exemptions
through RFRA by requiring courts to carve out religious exemptions
from all federal, state, and local laws and other government actions
unless the government could show a narrowly tailored compelling
interest for the law. 57
The full measure of RFRA was short-lived however. In the 1997
case City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that the RFRA exceeded
Congress’s constitutional power, at least as applied to state and local
governments. 58 The Court did not indicate, but subsequent federal courts
of appeals have held that RFRA continues to apply to laws enacted by
the federal government. 59 Thus, in the context of federal Indian religious
exemptions, RFRA is likely applicable. 60
C. Equal Protection
Regardless of the applicability of RFRA or the First Amendment, the
granting of a religious exemption to one but not all religions raises
questions of equal protection. Equal protection is based on both the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the express provision of

55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
56. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
57. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
58. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997). The case involved a San Antonio
historic preservation law that precluded a Catholic Church from remodeling a church building.
59. Id. at 512 (stricking down RFRA as exceeding congressional section five power under the
Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, while RFRA does not apply to the states, the Court left open the
possibility that RFRA may still be applied to the federal government. See United States v. Israel, 317
F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that RFRA may still apply as against the federal
government); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (2002) (finding that under RFRA, when the
federal government grants a religious exemption to Indian members of federally recognized tribes,
but not other Indians and non-Indians who were not members of recognized tribes, it must show this
discrimination was narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d
1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
60. See generally Hardman, 297 F.3d 1121 (undergoing a RFRA analysis of the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act).
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equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment. 61 Under either clause,
the Constitution mandates that similarly situated persons be treated
alike; 62 thus, under either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause or the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the analysis is the
same. 63
The fundamental right to equal protection is violated only by
purposeful and intentional discrimination. 64 Where the government
classifies or distinguishes between two or more relevant persons or
groups who are similarly situated, equal protection is violated unless the
government can show that the discrimination is narrowly tailored to
achieve some compelling interest. 65 Thus, an equal protection claim
might arise where the government, without compelling justification,
discriminates against, or gives a preference to, one group of people, such
as a racial or religious minority. 66
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE

61. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause “contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United
States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups.”).
62. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985).
63. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (explaining that the
standards for analyzing equal protection claims under either amendment are identical); see also
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74–75 (1981) (finding that the Fifth Amendment prohibited
unlawful gender-based discrimination despite the absence of an express defense of equal protection);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) (“Although it contains no Equal Protection
Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the
Federal Government from engaging in discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.’” (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding that while the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses are not always interchangeable, both protect against unjustifiable
discrimination and stem from “American ideals of fairness”))).
64. See generally Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (Equal Protection is a
fundamental right); Vera v. Tue, 73 F.3d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Discriminatory purpose . . .
implies more than intent as violation or as awareness of consequences . . . . It implies that the
decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action
at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.” (quoting
Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988))); Hispanic Taco Vendors v. City of Pasco,
994 F.2d 676, 679 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (a party must prove discriminatory intent to establish violation
of Equal Protection).
65. See, e.g., Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1988).
66. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000) (holding that a state constitutional
provision limiting the right to vote to certain “descendants” of specified peoples constituted racial
discrimination).
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Equal Protection, Due Process, Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause issues often are all implicated in claims challenging congressional
action to protect or infringe on Native American interests. The analysis,
however, becomes much more complicated when Indians’ religious
freedom interests are weighed against the government’s interest in
species conservation.
A. The Eagle
Protection of the eagle is at the center of much of the controversy
over whether Indians should be given religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws. 67 The eagle is an animal of spiritual and cultural
significance for the Native American. Likewise, the eagle holds a place
of patriotic, political, and ecological importance to the United States.
1. Importance to the Indian
While many animal species are important to Indian tribal life and
culture, the eagle is arguably the most important. 68 Eagles play a central
role in the spiritual practices of many tribes, 69 and eagle parts, as
religious objects, comprise a central role in Indian religious expression.
Judge Edward C. Reed noted that “[e]xperts in comparative religion have
likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of the
cross in the Christian faith.” 70 To the Indian, the eagle is a messenger to
the Creator; it is revered as a spiritual conduit and its feathers and other
parts are prized as tools that help the faithful communicate with
Divinity. 71 Whether in garb or in ritual, it is no exaggeration to say that
most spiritual and cultural tribal ceremonies involve eagles and eagle
67. Specifically, this Comment focuses on the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) and the
golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos). See MIKLOS D.F. UDVARDY & JOHN FARRAND, JR., NATIONAL
AUDUBON SOCIETY FIELD GUIDE TO NORTH AMERICAN BIRDS: WESTERN REGION 325–27 (rev. ed.
1997).
68. See Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v.
Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 788–95 (1995).
69. Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally Protected
Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709, 719–20 (1990). Discussing the congressional debates
surrounding amendments to the BGEPA, Boradiansky notes that “[s]imilarly the Department of the
Interior observed that ‘the eagle, by reason of its majestic, solitary, and mysterious nature, became
an especial object of worship. . . . The mythology of almost every tribe is replete with eagle
beings.’” Id. at 720 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1986 (1962)).
70. See United States v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp. 269, 276
(D. Nev. 1986), aff’d, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987).
71. See De Meo, supra note 68, at 775.

1586

3DALTON.FIN.DOC

1575]

3/14/2006 5:21:07 PM

There Is Nothing Light About Feathers

parts in some fashion. If access to eagles and eagle parts were
categorically prohibited, much of Indian culture and religion would
undoubtedly be lost. 72
2. Importance to the United States
The eagle also holds an important place of distinction to the United
States government. The bald eagle is the national symbol of the United
States. 73 It is revered, in a secular sense, as a representation of the
American ideal. It adorns the Great Seal of the United States and is often
seen adorning the staff that bears the national flag. 74 The bald eagle,
however, is not merely honored, but is protected by some of the most
potent laws ever enacted by Congress. 75

72. See Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. at 276 (“[A]ny scheme which limits the
access of the faithful to their talisman must be seen as having a profound effect on the exercise of
religious belief.” (citing United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (D.N.M. 1986))).
73. It is often noted that Benjamin Franklin was allegedly opposed to adopting the bald eagle
as our national symbol. See United States v. Hetzel, 385 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
In a letter to his daughter, Sarah “Sally” Bache, dated January 26, 1784, he expressed his opinion on
the 1782 Continental Congress’s action: “I wish the Bald Eagle had not been chosen as the
Representative of our Country; he is a Bird of bad moral Character; like those among Men who live
by Sharping and Robbing, he is generally poor, and often very lousy. The Turky [sic] is a much
more respectable Bird, and withal, a true original Native of America.” Id.; see also WALTER
ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 422–23 (2003). In fairness, Franklin’s “riff”
about the choice of the national bird may not have been motivated by a passion for turkey, but rather
as a means of deriding an effort by General George Washington to create a hereditary society of
merit for American Revolution veterans: the Society of the Cincinnati. See id. at 422. At the time of
Franklin’s letter to his daughter, Washington was promoting the order which had chosen the eagle as
the focal point of its seal. Id. Many chided the new order, commenting on how much the eagle in the
seal actually resembled a turkey. Id. at 422–23. Franklin ridiculed the order in his writings, making
the now famous quip about turkeys. Id. at 423. Even if the turkey was the bird receiving such
scrutiny, chances are there would still be controversy. Not only do turkeys have significance in
modern American culture at Thanksgiving, but turkeys and turkey parts play a role in myriad native
rituals. See, e.g., THOMAS E. MAILS, THE MYSTIC WARRIORS OF THE PLAINS: THE CULTURE, ARTS,
CRAFTS AND RELIGION OF THE PLAINS INDIANS 257, 379, 544 (2002) (referencing various purposes
for both eagle and turkey feathers and other parts by Plains Indians, including feathers for arrow
shafts, leg bones for war whistles, etc.).
74. See Bicentennial Year of the American Bald Eagle and National Bald Eagle Day,
Proclamation No. 4893, 47 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 28, 1982).
75. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 304 F. Supp 2d 1174, 1178 (D. Ariz.
2003) (“[In the Endangered Species Act,] Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it
abundantly clear that the balance [of equities] has been struck in favor of affording endangered
species the highest of priorities.” (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978))).
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Chief among these laws are the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act (“BGEPA”), 76 the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (“MBTA”), 77
and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”). 78 While each adds a
measure of protection to a variety of species, all three specifically protect
the bald eagle, with the BGEPA adding special protections to the golden
eagle as well. Arguably, all three acts infringe on Indian religious
freedom, 79 but the BGEPA expressly provides an exemption, permitting
the use of eagles and eagle parts for bona fide Indian religious
purposes. 80
B. The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
The BGEPA provides significant protection for bald and golden
eagles, and while Native Americans generally support such protection,
protecting eagles at all costs would severely interfere with the free
exercise of many Native American religions. Thus, among several
secular exemptions, 81 Congress provided a religious exemption to
accommodate Native American religious exercise. 82
1. The history and function of the Act
Congress passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act in 1940 to protect a
rapidly dwindling population of bald eagles. 83 The Act provided criminal

76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d (1994). Congress first turned its attention to the eagle in the late
1930s as bald eagle populations rapidly declined. See Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The
Religious Killing of Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990). Among the
reasons for the decline was a significant loss of habitat, unlawful takings, use of pesticides, and other
human disturbances such as electrical power lines. Id. In 1940, Congress enacted the Bald Eagle
Protection Act, ch. 278, § 1, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000)),
essentially making the bald eagle a “ward of the National Government.” See United States v. White,
508 F.2d 453, 460 (8th Cir. 1974); see also H.R. REP. NO. 76-2104 (1940). In passing the Act,
Congress explained that “the bald eagle is no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol
of the American ideals of freedom.” Bald Eagle Protection Act § 1, 54 Stat. at 250.
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2000).
78. Id. §§ 1531–1543.
79. See infra Part IV.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The enacting clause of the Act, provided,
Whereas the Continental Congress in 1782 adopted the bald eagle as the national
symbol; and Whereas the bald eagle thus became the symbolic representation of a new
nation under a new government in a new world; and Whereas by that Act of Congress

1588

3DALTON.FIN.DOC

1575]

3/14/2006 5:21:07 PM

There Is Nothing Light About Feathers

and civil penalties, but protected only bald eagles. 84 Because bald
eaglets 85 were nearly impossible to distinguish from golden eaglets, and
because golden eagle populations were beginning to decline, Congress
amended the act in 1962 to add the same protection to golden eagles. 86
Without a specific permit from the Secretary of the Interior, the Act
prohibits knowingly taking, 87 possessing, bartering, purchasing, selling,
offering for sale, purchase, or barter, transporting, exporting, or
importing any bald or golden eagle, whether alive or dead, or any eagle
part, nest, or egg. 88
The Act provides both criminal and civil penalties, as well as the
potential forfeiture of any property, real or personal, used to take or kill
an eagle. 89 Notably, however, the Act provides for certain exceptions.
Specifically, the Secretary of Interior may issue permits allowing the
possession of eagles or eagle parts for specific purposes, including:
scientific and exhibition purposes; protecting wildlife or agricultural
interests; seasonal protection of domesticated flocks and herds; falconry;
and the religious purposes of Indian tribes. 90
2. The Indian religious exemption
Because of the importance of the eagle in Native American religious
culture, Congress expressly provided a means by which members of
Indian tribes could be exempted from the law and allowed to possess
eagles and eagle parts for religious purposes pursuant to a federally

and by tradition and custom during the life of this Nation, the bald eagle is no longer a
mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of the American ideals of freedom; and
Whereas the bald eagle is now threatened with extinction: Therefore Be it
enacted . . . .
84. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 668–668d.
85. An “eaglet” is a young eagle. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2003).
86. See Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 668); see also 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1453. Act of October 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–
884, 76 Stat. 1246 (“[P]rotection of the golden eagle will afford greater protection for the bald eagle,
the national symbol of the United States of America, because the bald eagle is often killed by
persons mistaking it for the golden eagle.”).
87. “Take” includes pursuing, shooting, shooting at, poisoning, wounding, killing, capturing,
trapping, collecting, or molesting or disturbing. 16 U.S.C. § 668c; 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2004).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 22 (2004).
89. This includes the potential loss of grazing contracts with the federal government.
Anything used to take or kill an eagle is subject to forfeiture under the BGEPA. This includes not
only guns, traps, and nets, but also cars, boats, and other equipment. 16 U.S.C. §668b(b).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 22.21–.25.
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issued permit. 91 Thus, the 1962 amendments provided not only for the
preservation of the golden eagle but also for the preservation of a cultural
or religious practice. For example, in the Congressional House debate of
the 1962 amendments, Congress noted that access to eagles was
necessary “to continue ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep
religious or emotional significance to [Native Americans].” 92 Because
Congress was adding the golden eagle to the Act, it was understood that
this broader protection would substantially affect Native cultural and
religious practices, therefore Congress adopted the exemption. The
amendment, however, did more than allow for the use of eagles for
Indian religious purposes; it also provided exemptions for scientific,
educational, or exhibition purposes. 93 All such uses were contingent
upon compliance with a federally mandated permitting process discussed
below.
3. The permitting process
While the Act in its entirety has been a source of litigation, 94 the
permit process is the source of a majority of the litigation under the
BGEPA. Some argue that the process is too restrictive and unduly
infringes on Native American religious freedom. 95 Others argue that the
process unconstitutionally discriminates between Indians and nonIndians and between members of federally recognized tribes and those
whose tribes are not so recognized. 96
The Code of Federal Regulations outlines the requirements and
procedures for acquiring a permit to take eagles pursuant to one of the
enumerated exemptions. 97 Under the current regulations, to receive or
possess eagle parts an individual Indian must submit a written
application to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (USFWS), 98 which
91. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a; United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
92. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 741 (referencing the House debates on the BGEPA).
93. 16 U.S.C. §668a.
94. See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing challenges based on treaty rights).
95. See De Meo, supra note 68, at 788–95 (arguing that the permitting process is not
narrowly tailored because it still creates too heavy a burden on tribal free exercise).
96. See Appellee Joseluis Saenz’s Answer Brief at 34, Saenz v. Dep’t of the Interior (No. 002166) (on file at the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Denver, Colo.), reh’g en banc, United States v.
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
97. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.21–.22 (2004).
98. Id. § 22.22 (“[An applicant] must submit applications for permits to take, possess,
transport within the United States, or transport into or out of the United States lawfully acquired bald
or golden eagles, or their parts, nests, or eggs for Indian religious use to the appropriate Regional
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application includes the applicant’s general information, the species and
number of eagles or eagle parts requested (up to one whole eagle), the
location of the proposed religious activity, the name of the associated
tribe, the name of the ceremony, certification from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs that the applicant is Indian (and an enrolled member of a
federally recognized tribe), 99 and certification from the applicant’s
religious group authorizing the ceremony. 100
Indians may also apply to the USFWS to take or kill an eagle, but the
USFWS can approve such permits only with the consent of the Secretary
of the Interior. 101 Because a permit to take or kill an eagle is rare, 102
eagle remains are primarily obtained from the federal repository.
Notably, even forfeited or abandoned eagle-adorned property is subject
to the restrictions outlined in the Federal Regulations. 103
Thus, before a Native American can possess an eagle feather or
carcass of an eagle found in the wild, and before he or she can inherit or
receive as a gift any article made from or adorned with eagle parts, he or
she must obtain a permit to possess the article. 104 In essence, no one may
possess any eagle part without a permit, regardless of the nature of
acquisition. As outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, the
permitting process draws a line of distinction between Indians who are
members of federally recognized tribes and those who are not: those who
are not may not use eagle parts for any religious ceremony. 105
Director—Attention: Migratory Bird Permit Office. You can find addresses for the appropriate
Regional Directors in 50 CFR 2.2.”).
99. A federally recognized tribe is one that enjoys special recognition under federal statute,
and enjoys special protections and benefits. See Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994, 25
U.S.C. § 479a-1 (2000). Not all Indian tribes are federally recognized for various reasons, including
that they may have been “terminated” or disbanded by a prior act of Congress. See, e.g., discussion
on Chiricahua Apache tribe, infra note 156.
100. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a).
101. See id. § 22.22.
102. See Boradiansky, supra note 69, at 711 n.14 (noting that in 1990, the Hopi Tribe held the
only permit to take or kill eagles).
103. See 50 C.F.R. § 12.36(c) (“Wildlife and plants may be donated to individual American
Indians for the practice of traditional American Indian religions. Any donation of the parts of bald or
golden eagles to American Indians may only be made to individuals authorized by permit issued in
accordance with § 22.22 of this title to possess such items.”).
104. When the author explained this principle to his wife, she commented, “It’s just a feather;
we aren’t talking about getting a concealed weapons permit, right?” It may not be a far stretch to say
that some Indians might find it easier to get a concealed weapons permit than a permit to carry a
feather.
105. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (“We will issue a permit only to members of Indian entities recognized
and eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs listed under 25
U.S.C. 479a-1 engaged in religious activities who satisfy all the issuance criteria of this section.”).
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In addition to the federally recognized tribe requirement, Native
American applicants who otherwise meet all the requirements may be
disqualified for having prior criminal convictions or civil penalties
awarded for violations of related statutes or administrative
regulations. 106 Moreover, even if an application is otherwise viable, the
Secretary (or the Director of USFWS) may deny the permit if granting
the permit would threaten the eagle population. 107 Finally, if a permit is
authorized, the requested eagle or eagle parts are sent to the applicant
from the National Eagle Repository. 108
Despite the tedious requirements imposed by the BGEPA, the
application process does not necessarily create delays. 109 In fact, a
permit may be acquired relatively quickly, but receiving eagle parts can
take much longer due to the limited supply and the first-come-first-serve
nature of the allocation of eagle parts. Currently, there are over 5,000
people on the waiting list for approximately 1,000 eagles the Repository
receives each year. 110 Therefore, most of the delays seem to occur after
permits are granted: as few as two weeks to fill requests for feathers, six
months to a year to fill requests for eagle parts, and eighteen months or
longer to deliver an entire eagle carcass. 111
The permit system attempts to balance interests in species
conservation with the religious exercise of federally recognized tribes.
However, the shear demand for eagles and the monumental delays in
receiving eagle parts has led to frustration and perpetual conflict.

Interestingly, the permit system was enacted in 1974 and has been interpreted to allow permits only
to those Indians registered with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and enrolled in federally recognized
tribes. Yet, the regulations that prescribed the criteria for federal recognition of tribes were not
promulgated until 1978. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2004).
106. 50 C.F.R. § 13.21(b).
107. See id.
108. All remains of eagles that die of natural causes, or which are killed or captured, are
collected in one of the National Repositories. See National Eagle Repository, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, http://www.r6.fws.gov/law/le65.html (last visited March 23, 2005) [hereinafter National
Eagle Repository]. “The National Eagle Repository . . . is located at Rocky Mountain Arsenal
northeast of Denver, Colorado.” Id.
109. See United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (D. Or. 1995) (indicating that in 1995,
the initial review of an application averages 12.2 days, followed by a review by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) that averages 26.4 days in length).
110. See National Eagle Repository, supra note 108.
111. See Jim, 888 F. Supp. at 1060; see also Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust
Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act: Could the Application of the Doctrine Alter
the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L. 701, 706–07 (2000).
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IV. CHALLENGES TO THE BGEPA

Even though eagle parts are available to Indians through the permit
system, some have questioned why Indians should be compelled to seek
a permit at all. Because Indians have long-standing treaty rights to hunt
and fish and have compelling religious and cultural interests in having
continued access to eagles, some have argued that Indians should be
exempt from the permit process.
A. Indian Challenges Based on Treaty Rights
Most eagle feather cases have arisen as claims that Indian treaty or
hunting rights permit tribal members to hunt for eagles. 112 The issue of
treaty rights was addressed in United States v. Dion. 113 Dion, an enrolled
member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was convicted of, inter alia,
shooting four bald eagles. 114 Dion argued that the federal laws
prohibiting the taking or killing of eagles did not apply because the
takings at issue occurred entirely on a reservation in which the right to
hunt was absolutely protected by treaty. 115 The Court acknowledged the
general rule that “Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on
lands reserved to them, unless such rights were clearly relinquished by
treaty or have been modified by Congress.” 116 Yet, the Court held that
the treaty rights had, in fact, been abrogated by Congress through the
BGEPA. 117 While Congress must express an intention to abrogate Indian
treaty rights in plain and clear language, 118 the Court found
congressional intention unambiguous in the case of protecting eagles. 119
Once it was established that Congress had, indeed, abrogated treaty
hunting rights, challenges then shifted to attacking the Act on First
Amendment grounds. 120

112. See GETCHES, supra note 7, at 764.
113. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
114. Id. at 735–36.
115. The Court of Appeals held that the Yankton Sioux Tribe had a treaty right to hunt bald
and golden eagles. See id. at 736.
116. Id. at 738 (quoting F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 449 (1982)).
117. Id. at 743.
118. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353 (1941).
119. Dion, 476 U.S. at 743 (“It seems plain to us, upon reading the legislative history as a
whole, that Congress in 1962 believed that it was abrogating the rights of Indians to take eagles.”).
120. While the Bill of Rights has been interpreted as not applying against tribes, the
protections of the Bill of Rights are guaranteed to Indians with regards to state and federal action.
See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–85 (1896). Furthermore, portions of the Bill of Rights have
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B. Indian Challenges Based on Religious Freedom
While the BGEPA undoubtedly infringes on Indian religious
practices, challenges to its validity based on an infringement of free
exercise have largely been unsuccessful because of the government’s
compelling interest in conserving eagle populations.
For example, in United States v. Top Sky, 121 an Indian crafted
religious articles using eagle parts, which he subsequently sold to be used
in religious ceremonies. The tribal member was convicted for violation
of the BGEPA, but he challenged the conviction on the grounds that it
violated his right to free exercise of religion. 122 The Ninth Circuit upheld
the conviction on the basis that he was not convicted for exercising his
religion, but for selling eagle feathers, an activity expressly prohibited by
the Act and for which there is no exemption. 123
A similar challenge was raised in United States v. Thirty-Eight
Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts 124 where the government sought the
forfeiture of eagles and eagle parts obtained from a member of the Red
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians. The tribal member argued that the
seizure of his eagles and eagle parts violated, inter alia, his free exercise
rights, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), 125, and
various treaty rights. 126 Even though the court found that the BGEPA
had significant impact on the tribal member’s exercise of religious
beliefs, the court held that granting any exemption from the requirements
of the BGEPA (including a broader exemption that would not require
Indians to acquire permits) would “considerably impede [the]
Government’s interest in protecting endangered species.” 127
In United States v. Jim, 128 an enrolled member of the Yakima Nation
challenged his conviction under the BGEPA and the ESA on the basis
that it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 129 The
been codified in the Indian Civil Rights Act, adding a measure of protection for Indians and nonIndians against Tribal action as well. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”), Pub. L. No. 90284, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 73, 77–81 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, 1321–
1326, 1331, 1341 (2000)).
121. 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 485.
123. Id.
124. 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000).
126. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. at 271.
127. Id. at 270.
128. 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995), aff’d, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
129. Id. at 1059–60.
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court upheld the Indian’s conviction for killing two golden and two bald
eagles even though BGEPA and ESA substantially burdened his exercise
of religion. 130 The court found that Jim could have sought a permit, and
while the permit system would have inconvenienced his religious
exercise, “mere inconvenience is insufficient” to constitute a violation of
his constitutional rights. 131 Rather, to be subject to constitutional
challenge the law must “interfere with a tenet or belief that is central to
religious doctrine.” 132
Interestingly, in United States v. Gonzales, a federal district court
held that the requirement to identify the religious ceremony for which
eagle parts will be used is not the least restrictive (narrowly tailored)
means of advancing the government’s interest. 133 In Gonzales, an Indian
accused of violating the BGEPA had failed to comply with the permit
process because he wished not to disclose the secret (sacred) nature of a
particular Indian religious ceremony. 134 In analyzing the defendant’s
RFRA challenge, the court found that the requirement to list the specific
ceremony was not the least restrictive means to effectuate the
government’s compelling interest. 135
Despite Gonzales, the weight of authority indicates that challenges
by tribal members to the validity of the BGEPA based on free exercise
theories will typically fail because the government’s interest in
protecting species was deemed to be compelling. 136

130. Id. at 1063–64.
131. Id. at 1061 (citing Graham v. Comm’r, 822 F.2d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 1987)).
132. Id. The Eighth Circuit has affirmed this reasoning that opening the door to individualized
exceptions under the BGEPA would undermine the primary purposes of the Act. See United States
v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001). Notably, the Oliver court also dismissed the claim that the
government lacked a compelling interest because of a recent, though not final, proposal to remove
the eagle from the endangered species list. See id. at 589.
133. 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997).
134. Pursuant to 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(4), (6) (2004), an applicant for a permit must disclose
the name and nature of the religious ceremony for which eagle parts are requested and must have a
certification from a tribal religious leader that the ceremony is bona fide.
135. The court noted that the permit application requires applicants to certify, under criminal
penalty of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000), that the information provided in the application is true.
Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. at 1229. It then found that “[t]his requirement is sufficient to protect the
government’s compelling interest.” Id. Instead of requiring the additional two components of the
application, see 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(4) and (6), the government could “simply require each
applicant to swear under penalty of criminal prosecution for perjury that the applicant will use the
eagle in a Native American religious ceremony in which the applicant is qualified to participate.”
Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. at 1229.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997) (following
precedent in upholding a conviction under BGEPA thereby rejecting a free exercise claim); see also
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V. PREVIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE INDIAN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION
Unlike members of federally recognized tribes, other Indians and
non-Indian adherents to the Native American religion are completely
precluded from properly exercising their religious beliefs because they
are not able to receive a permit granting a religious exemption to the
BGEPA. 137 Is there a compelling reason to discriminate between
members of federally recognized tribes and others who share similar
religious convictions? Because eagle parts are just as central to nonfederally recognized practitioners of the Native American Church, nonNative Americans have raised challenges to the BGEPA based on
violations of both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause. Short
of deciding the constitutional question, the courts have often been able to
decide individual cases under RFRA.
A. The Non-Indian: Rupert and Lundquist
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether the BGEPA
exemptions violated RFRA and the Establishment Clause in Rupert v.
Director, United States Fish and Wildlife Service. 138 In Rupert, the First
Circuit held that RFRA did not require that non-Native American
practitioners of Indian religions be able to obtain eagle parts for religious
purposes. Likewise, the court held that even though the BGEPA
ostensibly preferenced federally recognized tribes, it did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The exemption, the court held, “does not merely
serve the government’s interests in (1) protecting Native American
religion and culture and (2) protecting a dwindling and precious eagle
population; it sets those interests in equipoise.” 139
The plaintiff in Rupert challenged the BGEPA as a violation of the
Establishment Clause because the permitting process effectively favored
one religious group. 140 The court applied an equal protection analysis
De Meo, supra note 68, at 802–07; Perkins, supra note 111, at 703. But See United States v. Abeyta,
632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding that the BGEPA was violative of free exercise
rights because the process to obtain needed eagle parts can take as long as eighteen months to two
years and is “unnecessarily intrusive and hostile to religious privacy”).
137. Pursuant to the BGEPA, only those identified within the text of the Act are permitted to
possess eagle parts. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 22.21–22.24 (discussing the requirements to obtain a permit
for scientific and exhibition purposes, Indian religious purposes, depredation purposes, and falconry
purposes).
138. 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992).
139. Id. at 35.
140. Id. at 33–34.
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that had previously been applied in cases of alleged denominational
preference. 141 But the court distinguished the cases by noting that
recognized tribes have a “unique legal status under federal law” and that
Congress has “plenary power . . . based on a history of treaties and the
assumption of a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of federally
recognized Indian tribes.” 142 The court reasoned that while
denominational preferences are usually reviewed under a strict scrutiny
standard, the unique political status—often referred to as the “guardianward” relationship—between the quasi-sovereign tribes and the federal
government, warranted only a rational basis review. 143 Ultimately, the
court held that a tribe’s status is not racial or religious, but political in
nature. 144 Thus, finding that there was a rational basis for the BGEPA
exemption, that is the protection of the religion and culture of a political
class of Indians, the court upheld the exemption. 145
Likewise, in Oregon, a federal district court rejected a claim that the
BGEPA permit process should be judicially amended to allow nonNative Americans to acquire religious exemption permits. 146 In United
States v. Lundquist, the court found sufficient evidence to prove that the
government’s compelling interests—species conservation and preserving
Native American culture and religion—would be undermined by an
expansion of the religious exemption to include non-federally recognized
Indians. 147 Ultimately, the court rejected the RFRA claim, because
141. See id. at 34 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying equal protection analysis to exemptions from drug laws); Olsen v. Drug
Enforcement Agency, 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[I]n cases of this character,
establishment clause and equal protection analyses converge.”); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497,
513 (1st Cir. 1984); see also Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 753, 797 (1984) (“Overarching the tests of the religion clauses is the equal protection
principle that suspect classifications, including religious classifications, are sustainable only when
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.”).
142. Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34–35 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974)).
143. Id. at 35 (“We therefore see no reason not to use the ‘rational relationship’ analysis here,
where the government has treated Native Americans differently from others in a manner that
arguably creates a religious classification.” (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646
(1977))).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996). Legally, the defendant was
a non-Native American who practiced a Native American religion; he was not enrolled in any
federally recognized tribe. Nevertheless, he claimed to be descended from Cherokee and Lakota
Sioux Indian grandparents. Id. at 1239.
147. Id. at 1242–43.
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eagles still warranted protection, and because protecting the limited
supply of eagles was rationally related to the preservation of the spiritual
and cultural practices of federally recognized tribes. 148
As in Rupert and Lundquist, most challenges to the BGEPA brought
by non-Indians have failed, both because of the compelling governmental
interest in protecting eagles and in protecting Indian culture. On the
latter, the government has generally contended that expanding the
religious exemptions to non-Indians could infringe on the ability of
Indians to seek and receive eagle parts for religious ceremonies.
Ironically, even those who are racial Indians do not necessarily benefit
from the exemption to the BGEPA.
B. The Non-Federally Recognized Indian: Gibson v. Babbitt
Employing a RFRA analysis, the court in Gibson v. Babbitt, 149 held
that the government was justified in discriminating between members of
federally recognized Indian tribes and other Indians. The court
determined that the government had a compelling interest in preserving
the limited supply of bald and golden eagle parts for those with whom
the federal government had a special, political obligation. 150 In
upholding the permit process, the court reasoned that the distinction was
the least restrictive means of effecting species conservation while
fulfilling treaty obligations to recognized tribes and preserving Native
American cultures. 151
Ostensibly, whether on free exercise (First Amendment or RFRA)
claims, or under an Establishment Clause analysis, most cases through
Babbitt seemed to infer that the government has a compelling interest—
whether protecting eagles or preserving Native American culture and
religion.
VI. RECENT CASES AND THE SCOPE OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST FOR
INDIAN-LIMITED EXEMPTIONS
More recent cases have inferred that the extent of the government’s
compelling interest at the expense of religious exercise may be waning

148.
149.
150.
151.
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with the restoration of eagle populations. 152 Still, there is a seeming split
among the circuits on this point.
A. United States v. Hardman: Not Necessarily Narrowly Tailored
In contrast to Babbitt, Lundquist, and Rupert, which generally upheld
the preferential exemption afforded members of federally recognized
tribes, recently the Tenth Circuit has ostensibly opened the door to an
expansion. Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit reheard three separate but
similar cases. 153 The cases involved three faithful adherents to the Native
American faith: one non-Indian; 154 one non-Indian claiming to be
informally adopted into a federally recognized tribe; 155 and one Indian
who is not a member of any currently recognized federal tribe. 156
152. See Amie Jamieson, Will Bald Eagles Remain Compelling Enough to Validate the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act After ESA Delisting? The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis in United States
v. Antoine, 34 ENVTL. L. 929, 947–48 (2004) (describing a series of cases that imply that as eagles
are removed from the Endangered Species List that the state may no longer have a compelling
interest); see also United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.M. 1986).
153. United States v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 WL 892808 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.
2001); Saenz v. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 00-2166, 2001 WL 892631 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001), reh’g
en banc granted, opinion vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Wilgus, No. 00-4015, 2001 WL 892798, (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
154. Hardman was a non-Indian practitioner of the Native American religion for over fourteen
years and lived on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Neola, Utah. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1118.
He was previously married to a member of the federally recognized S’Kallum Tribe located in
Washington State and was father to two children enrolled in the their mother’s tribe. Id. A Hopi
Medicine Man gave Hardman a bundle of prayer feathers after he transported the body of a tribal
elder, and his son’s Godfather, to Arizona for funeral services. Id. Hardman was charged with, and
pled guilty to, a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”). Id.
155. Wilgus is not of Native American descent and is not a member of any federally
recognized tribe. Id. at 1119. He faithfully practices the Native American religion and claims to be
an adopted member of the Paiute Tribe of Utah, despite the fact that Paiute Tribal law does not
recognize the adoption of non-Indians as members of the Tribe. Id. at 1119 n.3. Wilgus had received
a number of eagle feathers from various Native Americans and was charged with violating the Bald
and Gold Eagle Protection Act (“BGEPA”). Id.
156. Saenz is a descendant of the Chiricahua Apache Indian Tribe, which was once a federally
recognized tribe, but which was terminated/disbanded in 1886. Id. at 1119. Saenz obtained numerous
eagle feather items in connection with various religious ceremonies. Id. at 1120. He was charged
under the BGEPA but charges were ultimately dismissed. Id. In his suit, Saenz sought retrieval of
the seized eagle feather relics. Id. The Chiricahua Apache, from which Saenz descends, are best
known for legendary stories of their leader, Geronimo, who led a fierce Apache rebellion in the
1880s. See GERONIMO, GERONIMO: HIS OWN STORY 54 (S.M. Barrett trans., Plume Books rev. ed.
1996) (1969). The Chiricahua Tribe has not been federally recognized since at least 1886 when the
U.S. Government disbanded the tribe. Id. at 110 (indicating that the final surrender of Geronimo
occurred in August of 1886); see also In re Saenz, No. 00-2166, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, at *2
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Although each case presented slightly unique factual scenarios, each
ultimately posed a similar question: is the government’s scheme under
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest, thus justifying the
basis for discrimination against faithful non-Indians and Indians seeking
to participate in the Native American religion?
The court held that the government’s seizure of eagle feathers from
Saenz, a native Indian, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. 157 Concurrently with this holding, the court remanded the other two
non-Indian challenges to the BGEPA on the basis that the government
failed to prove that its eagle permit system, as administered, was in fact
the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest. 158
The government argued that it had two compelling interests: “(a)
protecting eagles and (b) preserving Native American culture and
religion and pursuing the federal government’s trust obligations to
Native American Tribes.” 159 On the first interest, the court noted that the
government’s interest is not only based on preservation of the species,
but perpetuation of the national symbol. 160 And since the population of
bald and golden eagles had been increasing, the court ruled that the
government’s interest, while still compelling, was undermined and may
not actually justify the full scope of the former protection. 161 Therefore,
the court held that the BGEPA, with its narrow exemption, may not be as
narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means of achieving the
interest. 162
On the second interest, the court acknowledged the government’s
argument that the long-standing obligation to preserve Native American
(10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001); Appellee Joseluis Saenz’s Answer Brief at 5, Saenz v. Dep’t of the Interior
(No. 00-2166) (on file at the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Denver, Colo.), reh’g en banc,
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116.
157. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1131. In re Saenz, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698, was one of three
cases consolidated and reheard en banc by the Tenth Circuit in Hardman. In the Saenz case, the
court confronted the issue of whether a member of a previously recognized Indian tribe should have
eagle feathers that were seized by the government returned to him.
158. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1131. The non-Indians’ RFRA claims were dismissed at trial and
therefore no factual record had been developed on whether the government’s means of achieving the
compelling interest was the least restrictive. Id.
159. Id. at 1127.
160. Id. The court noted that “most” other courts have likewise held that preservation of the
eagle is a compelling interest. Id. (citing United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356,
1360 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000)).
161. Id. at 1127–28.
162. Id. at 1128.
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cultures, concomitant with the Indian Commerce Power and the
guardian-ward relationship, is compelling. 163 It further acknowledged
that, in the context of government action in the furtherance of the Indian
trust responsibility and Congress’s “extraordinarily broad power” to
legislate Indian affairs, Congressional action is generally only required to
have some rational basis to be upheld. 164 However, because RFRA was
implicated, the court held that Congress “plainly commands that . . .
federal program[s] that substantially burden[] religion must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.” 165
With regards to Mr. Saenz, the Chiricahua Apache, the court
reviewed the record and found that the government had failed to prove
that limiting eagle permits only to members of federally recognized
tribes was the least restrictive means of preserving eagle populations
while protecting Native American culture. 166 As for the protection of
eagles, the court reasoned that the government provided nothing more
than supposition that expanding the permit process to include all Indian
religious adherents, and not just those recognized by the government,
would affect bird populations. 167 Further, because the government
provided nothing more than tenuous statistics and unfounded
suppositions, the court repudiated the assertion that increasing the
number of potential permit applicants would increase the wait period for
eagle parts, thus increasing the potential for poaching. 168
On the issue of cultural preservation, the court similarly rejected the
government’s argument as “mere speculation.” 169 The government
argued that allowing non-federally recognized Indians to apply for
permits would increase the waiting period for members of recognized
tribes, thus jeopardizing their religion and culture. 170 While

163. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); Rupert v.
Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992)).
164. Id. at 1128–29 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978)).
165. Id. at 1129.
166. Id. at 1132.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1132–33. The court found the opposite to be equally plausible: while the wait
period might increase for members of federally recognized tribes, the wait would decrease for
Indians who previously had no legal access, thus potentially offsetting any potential increase in
poaching by federally recognized Indians with a decrease in poaching among non-federally
recognized Indians.
169. Id. at 1133.
170. Id.
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acknowledging the government’s interest in preserving cultural practices
as a means of preserving the tribes, 171 the court noted, however, that
“[a]llowing a wider variety of people to participate in the Native
American religion could just as easily foster Native American culture
and religion by exposing it to a wider array of persons.” 172
The government also argued that expanding the permit process to
include all Native Americans would transform a proper political
distinction 173 into an impermissible race-based classification. 174
However, the court seemed dismissive of this argument in describing the
unique legal status of tribes and the historic government-to-government
relationship. 175 In essence, the court implied that where Congress is
acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Power or under its trust
obligations, such actions are based on a “political” status and not a racial
or religious classification.
Ultimately, the court found the record to be inadequate in the case of
the two non-Indians, and fatal in the case of Saenz. 176 Whether the
permitting process was the least restrictive means to achieve both the
preservation of eagles and the perpetuation of tribal sovereignty and
culture seemed to hinge on the number and status of the eagle. 177
Because the government could not show that expanding access to eagle
parts would in fact harm either eagles or the recognized tribes, the
exclusive exemption was not intuitively the least restrictive means. 178

171. Id. at 1133 n.2.
172. Id. at 1133.
173. This political distinction is one based on the Court’s holding in Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974), which defined the status of being an Indian as one of a political nature and
not merely racial.
174. See Brief for the Appellant, Saenz v. Dep’t of the Interior at 23–24, (No. 00-2166) (on
file at the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, Denver, Colo.), reh’g en banc, Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,
reh’g en banc, Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116.
175. See Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128 (“The Supreme Court has therefore held that limited
hiring preferences for Native Americans at the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not constitute unlawful
race discrimination.” (citing Mancari, 417 U.S at 553–54)).
176. Id. at 1133.
177. Id. at 1135.
178. Id. at 1136.
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B. United States v. Antoine: Finding the BGEPA
To Be Narrowly Tailored—For Now

In contrast, the Ninth Circuit did not follow Hardman in a case with
very similar facts. In United States v. Antoine, 179 the court found that the
government’s evidence, which was similar in nature to the evidence
adduced in Hardman, was sufficient to show that the permitting process
was the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s compelling
interests. 180
Antoine, a member of the Cowichan Band of the Salish Indian Tribe
in British Columbia, Canada, was convicted of violating the BGEPA
while in the United States. 181 Antoine challenged the conviction under
RFRA, but the Ninth Circuit found that the government had narrowly
tailored the statute to achieve a balance in species protection and
preservation of Native culture and religion. 182 The court reasoned that
the BGEPA permit program does not deny Antoine a permit because of
his religion, but rather because of his political classification. 183 The court
found that the evidence supported this distinction and that the
government’s interest was sufficiently compelling to justify the apparent
discrimination. 184
Antoine also sought to invalidate his conviction by arguing that a
proposed rule to remove the bald eagle from the Endangered Species List
showed that the government’s interest was no longer compelling enough
to justify the infringement on his religious exercises. 185 However, while
the court discounted the proposed rule as not substantially weakening the
governmental interest, it did infer that a final rule might provide the type
of “substantial change” 186 that could “render a well-tailored statute
misproportioned.” 187 Ultimately, the court upheld the permitting
program.

179. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 923.
181. Id. at 920.
182. Id. at 924.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 921–22.
186. Id. at 922.
187. See id. at 921–22 (“Because the delisting proposal is based on incomplete information, it
carries less weight than a final rule.”).
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VII. THE RATIONALE FOR THE INDIAN-LIMITED EXEMPTION
The apparent split between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits leaves many
unanswered questions. First and foremost, will the purpose of the
BGEPA remain compelling when bald eagles are removed from the
Endangered Species List, or is there another compelling basis for the
protection? Second, assuming that protection of eagles remains
compelling, is the basis for the Indian religious exemption valid? Why
should members of federally recognized Indian tribes receive special
protection?
This Comment advocates that there are legitimate reasons to
distinguish and give special treatment to members of federally
recognized tribes. The tribes have a unique place in our constitutional
structure that gives them a special political classification. Even if such
distinctions were characterized by race or religion, the government could
find a compelling interest in fulfilling its trust responsibilities and
preserving Indian culture and sovereignty. Furthermore, if race or
religion were deemed to be motivating factors, Congress might still be
justified in exempting Indians from the BGEPA on other bases: namely,
to remedy past discrimination against Indians. However, classifying
Indian tribes as only political, only racial, or only religious could subject
them to discrimination that would be prohibited with any other religious
or racial minority. Consequently, if an action is justified entirely on the
basis of one of these classifications, then tribes and Indians will not be
afforded the full protections given to them by Congress and provided in
U.S. Constitution.
A. Plenary Power, Trust Obligations, and
Other Reasons To Prefer Indian Tribes
First, any action by Congress relating to an Indian tribe, including
granting a religious exemption, is ostensibly within its power—when
acting to regulate the affairs of or interactions with Indian tribes,
Congress has exclusive authority. 188 Furthermore, this power is said to
be plenary, meaning that Congress has absolute power to regulate the

188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”); see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (“The treaties and laws of the United States
contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all
intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”).
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affairs of Indian tribes. 189 With regards to the tribes, as legal or political
entities, Congress’s power is virtually unbounded; 190 Congress has the
power to prefer 191 or even destroy tribes if it chooses. 192 However,
Congress is bounded by the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United
States. Thus, where rights and obligations are established by treaty or
statute, they remain unless such rights and obligations are abrogated. 193
Because Congress has plenary power, it has power to exempt Indian
tribes and their members from otherwise generally applicable laws. 194
What remains in question, however, is whether such power is limited by
any of the Constitution’s other protections. 195

189. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (holding that Congress has
plenary power of tribes); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (affirming the principle that federal law
preempts state law on matters of Indian affairs); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–65
(1903) (maintaining that congressional authority over Indians is plenary, political, and not
justiciable). But see Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 90 (1977) (indicating that
congressional plenary power over Indian tribes does not prevent a due process challenge).
190. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195 (1984) (discussing the various connotations of “plenary
power”). “As to the category of unlimited power, if a general power over Indian affairs exists, any
legislation relating to Indians would be permissible.” Id. at 196 n.3 (citing United States v. Rogers,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1840) for the proposition that “congressional policy decisions dealing
with Indians are not open to question by the judiciary”).
191. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1974) (affirming certain preferences
granted to members of Indian tribes).
192. Many tribes were congressionally dissolved by individual acts that “terminated” the
tribe’s political existence. See, e.g., 1954 Klamath Termination Act, ch. 732, § 1, 68 Stat. 718 (1954)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 564 (2000)). Consider the case of the Menominee Tribe, which was
recognized and granted a reservation under the Treaty of Wolf River in 1854, but which was
terminated in 1954. See Menominee Tribe v. United States 391 U.S. 404, 405, 407 (1968).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (finding that Congress
intended to abrogate treaty rights to hunt eagles); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 687 (1979) (finding that congressional regulation of Indian
fishing rights abrogated treaty rights to unlimited fishing on reservation); Menominee Tribe, 391
U.S. at 412 (finding that despite the fact that Congress terminated the tribe, it did not expressly
abrogate the treaty hunting and fishing rights secured for the members of the tribe); United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353–54 (1941) (holding that Congress may abrogate
treaties but must be clear that it intended to do so); Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (reaffirming that
Congress has power to abrogate treaties with Indian tribes).
194. See AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000) (providing a religious exemption for use of peyote).
195. See Newton, supra note 190, at 196–97 (describing the unique status of Indian tribes as a
justification of Congressional plenary power).
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1. Tribal sovereignty and the unique legal and political classification of
tribes
While Congress has power to regulate Indian tribes, to their benefit
or detriment, 196 there are very good reasons why Congress should
continue to give special consideration to tribes and to their culture and
religion. Chief among these, and perhaps the most significant factor
tending to support the myriad exemptions and seeming preferences
afforded Indian tribes, is their unique legal and political relationship with
the United States. While members of a particular Indian tribe often share
common customs, history, religion, and ethnicity, the tribal entity is more
than a racial group, a social club, or a church; it is an inherent sovereign
with a distinct political identity. 197 Tribes are a type of “domestic
dependent nation[],” 198 that have historically held a status often referred
to as quasi-sovereign and have interacted with the federal government on
a government-to-government basis. 199 Many tribes have treaties 200 or
statutory agreements 201 with the United States that have the force of law

196. See generally Allison Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of NineteenthCentury Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49
STAN. L. REV. 773 (1997) (describing nineteenth-century congressional and judicial actions that
ostensibly suppressed traditional Indian beliefs and practices and comparing those to more recent
government activities).
197. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 530–31 (1832) (acknowledging the
inherent sovereignty of the Cherokee nation as a distinct political entity, capable of maintaining
relations of peace and war, with boundaries, and the right to self-government). “The Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial; with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power . . . .” Id. at 519.
[W]e have admitted, by the most solemn sanctions, the existence of the Indians as a
separate and distinct people, and as being vested with rights which constitute them a
state, or separate community—not a foreign, but a domestic community—not as
belonging to the confederacy, but as existing within it, and, of necessity, bearing to it a
peculiar relation.
Id. at 583.
198. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
199. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (describing tribes as “quasi-sovereign”
entities that are uniquely governed by the federal government); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519
(“[I]ntercourse with [Indians] shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”).
200. See, e.g., Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, partially reprinted in
GETCHES, supra note 7, at 87–88; see also e.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976)
(discussing provisions of the Treaty of Medicine Creek and other treaties between the United States
and fourteen tribes in western Washington).
201. In 1871, Congress attached a rider to the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 that
effectively ended all treaty-making with Indian tribes and provided that all future agreements with
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and that promised certain services and benefits in exchange for the
cession of tribal occupancy rights of vast tracts of land. 202 The rights and
privileges provided for in these agreements are federal law and are
supreme unless Congress expressly abridges them. 203
Thus, as various courts have affirmed, tribal status is and can be
genuinely characterized as a political status, and membership in a
federally recognized tribe is a legitimate basis for special treatment. 204 It
is a proper impetus for granting Indian tribes exemptions to otherwise
generally applicable laws, so long as there is a rational basis in doing
so. 205 In other words, being an Indian is a political distinction that
counts.
2. Federal trust obligations and the guardian-ward relationship
More than just being an Indian, being a member of a federally
recognized tribe not only counts, but is central to the debate on Indian
exemptions and special preferences. There is a special trust relationship
between the federal government and the various tribes, 206 and this
relationship is also a basis for congressional action to prefer, promote, or
benefit Indian tribes, including the special Indian religious exemption to
the BGEPA. The federal government has a “distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent . . . in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes

tribes would be statutory in nature, requiring adoption in both houses of Congress and the signature
of the President to become law. See GETCHES, supra note 7, at 152 (citing Indian Appropriation Act
of 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871)).
202. See GETCHES, supra note 7, at 2–3. In return for certain promises and rights, treaties were
entered into with tribes, “to the extent necessary to procure their consent to cession of their right to
occupy the land.” Id. at 2.
203. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559 (“The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as
well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are
capable of making treaties.”); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (finding that
Congress intended to abrogate Indian treaty hunting rights); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (indicating a reluctance to find
congressional abrogation of treaty rights unless express) (citing Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
204. See, e.g., Morton, 417 U.S. at 554–55.
205. See generally AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 1, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 (2000)).
206. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (discussing the federal
trust responsibilities to Indians); Tulee v. Washington, 316 U.S. 681 (1942) (same); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (same); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, (1831)
(same).
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exploited people [referring to Indians].” 207 In carrying out its treaty
obligations, the government is “something more than a mere contracting
party.” 208 Rather, the government has a fiduciary duty: “Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” 209
The long history of cases on the subject 210 generally adopt the view
that the federal-tribal relationship is one in which the federal government
must protect Native American interests while leaving an element of
sovereign power in the tribes. 211 Nevertheless, as one court has noted,
“The existence of a general fiduciary duty does not mean . . . that every
Government action disliked by the Indians is automatically a violation of
that trust.” 212 And while the trust doctrine is typically applied in the
context of protecting tribal land and other legal and economic interests, it
has also been extended to apply to other social, cultural, and religious
interests. 213 In fact, Congress has expressly adopted a policy of
protecting Indian religion and culture through the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act. 214
The history of congressional power over Indian affairs runs parallel
with Congress’s historic protective role. Tribes have been described as
“wards of the nation” 215 and the federal government as guardian. 216
Courts have long believed that Indian communities are dependent on the
federal government. 217 Because of treaties in which tribes ceded land

207. See Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 297 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928)).
210. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 530–31
(1832).
211. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1496–99.
212. See Cherokee Nation v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 565, 577 (1990) (quoting Pawnee v.
United States, 830 F.2d 187, 190 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988)).
213. See Sharon L. O’Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REV. 451
(1995) (arguing “that the federal government is obligated by the special status” of Indian tribes and
Congress’s special trust relationship to ensure religious preservation among tribes).
214. See AIRFA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 2, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994); (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)). At least one scholar believes that because Congress enacted AIRFA, it
elevated the influence of the Indian Trust Doctrine. See Perkins, supra note 111 at 719–21.
215. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–83 (1886).
216. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (characterizing the relationship
between the United States and Indian Tribes as “guardian-ward”).
217. See id. (noting that because of the treatment of tribes throughout American history,
Indians were, at the time, dependent on the United States for “daily food,” “political rights,” and
protection). Id. “They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because
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and authority, wars in which tribes were conquered or disarmed, and
bitter dealings in which tribes were often treated less than favorably,
courts have recognized a duty of protection that arises from
congressional assumption of power. 218 In this context, to fulfill its
obligation as trustee, the federal government may be obligated to
preserve Indian religious rights. 219
While some might criticize this policy 220 and its various
manifestations, 221 the trust relationship may justify congressional actions
that might otherwise violate constitutional protections. Because of the
guardian-ward classification, giving tribes a religious preference—or
otherwise reasonably accommodating their religious practices—can be
no more violative of the Establishment Clause than making reasonable
accommodations for a child in state custody to practice her religious
beliefs. 222 Actually, because of the First Amendment, such
accommodation and facilitation may actually be required to fulfill the
guardian obligations. 223 Thus, in a real sense, the Indian religious
exemption to the BGEPA is justified, not as a violation of the First
Amendment, but as an accommodation of the religious exercise of a
ward of the federal government. However, as will be discussed below,
while the exemption may be justified, the administration of the current
eagle permitting system may go beyond mere accommodation and into
excessive entanglement.

of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies.” Id.
218. Id.; see also Newton, supra note 190 at 215.
219. See O’Brien, supra note 213, at 474–83.
220. See, e.g., Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff argued that limiting the religious exemption of the BGEPA was an unconstitutional
denominational preference and violative of the Establishment Clause. Id.
221. See AIRFA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 2, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)) (creating an express exemption for Indian religious use of peyote); 1962
Amendments to the Bald Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962) (amending
16 U.S.C. §§ 668, 668a) (creating exemption for Indian religious use of eagle feathers).
222. See Bruker v. City of New York, 337 F. Supp. 2d 539, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (The First
Amendment requires state to make “‘reasonable efforts to assure that the religious needs of the
children’ placed in foster care are met during the period of that care.” (quoting Wilder v. Bernstein,
848 F.2d 1338, 1347 (2nd Cir. 1988))).
223. Cf. id. at 555 (requiring religious accommodation for foster children because they are
wards of the state). Some have suggested that the Indian Trust Doctrine may actually be used to
challenge the validity of the BGEPA, despite the exemptions providing for religious purposes of
Indians. See Perkins, supra note 111, at 713–14 (arguing that the trust doctrine will be the next mode
of challenging the BGEPA by Native Americans).
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3. Special Indian religious accommodation derives from the same basis
as other Indian preferences
Putting aside the issues arising from the Establishment Clause, it is
clear that other Indian preferences have been upheld against equal
protection challenges under a similar analysis. 224 In fact, Indian
preferences are upheld because of the unique status of Indian tribes and
because of the federal government’s fiduciary duties. 225 Whether
granting special tax status to Indians, 226 providing for employment
preferences, 227 awarding special welfare benefits, 228 or providing for
special judicial treatment, 229 Congress has authority to prefer Indians
“[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment
of Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed.” 230
In reviewing the breadth of such Indian preferences, it is difficult to
precisely distinguish religious preference—which raise First Amendment
concerns—from cultural preferences that have little or no First
Amendment implications. Still, considering the interconnection of
religion and every other aspect of Indian life, the basis for allowing
Congress to act in nonreligious contexts should apply even when the
scope of congressional protection crosses into religious/cultural areas.
4. Inadequate classifications: using race and religion in protecting tribal
rights as a means of remedying past discrimination
Part of the difficulty in addressing Indian exemptions to generally
applicable laws, including Indian religious exemptions to the BGEPA, is
that Indian tribes cannot be singularly classified as political, religious,

224. See Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34–35 (holding that claim is rooted in the Establishment Clause
and “requires an equal protection mode of analysis.” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
225. Government actions that preference Indians have become widely accepted because the
unique political status of tribes leaves them singularly situated (as opposed to similarly situated). See
infra notes 229–32.
226. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 709 (1943) (upholding federally
granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973) (same).
227. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
228. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 230 (1974) (upholding special federal welfare benefits
for Indians “on or near” reservations).
229. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (upholding grants/reservations of
jurisdiction to tribal courts over reservation affairs).
230. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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racial, or social groups. Although they are duly characterized as political
sovereigns, within a tribe they generally share common cultural and
religious beliefs and practices. They also share a common race and
ethnicity. This notion challenges what is arguably one of the flaws of the
American social conscience, which seemingly infects legal reasoning:
the inability to accept that not every social, cultural, religious, or political
phenomenon can be defined in terms of American conception.
Consider the American treatment of property ownership. Property
ownership plays a fundamental role in American society, 231 as seen in
the notions of manifest destiny 232 and common notions of the American
dream. 233 Consequently, as the United States emerged from colonial
infancy and expanded westward, individuals and governments built
fences and drew boundaries. 234 This division of property had significant
impact on American Indians 235 who were not acquainted with the
American conception of property ownership, largely because the Indians
believed that men did not own the land, rather men belonged to the
land. 236
Another concept that seems inherent to the American paradigm, but
which was foreign to Indian conceptions of life, is the view that spiritual
and religious life can be separated from daily living and culture. For
231. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1348–49 (2000) (identifying
home/property ownership as a fundamental aspect of the American dream).
232. See generally Karin P. Sheldon, The Thrilling Days of Yesteryear: Some Comments on
the Settlement of the West and the Development of Federal Land and Resource Law, SF34 A.L.I.A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 1, 9 (2000).
233. The American Dream, in this context refers to the common desire of many Americans to
work and acquire enough wealth to own a home and land. See Mann, supra note 231, at 1348–49.
One poignant example of the historical underpinnings of the American aspiration of property
ownership can be seen in the aftermath of the Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 339, 341–342, 348–349, 354 (1994)). The Act
opened up vast tracts of previously Indian land in the Oklahoma Territory and in the rest of the
United States to white settlement. Id.; see Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country,
14 ALASKA L. REV. 283, 306 (1997). The Oklahoma land runs later became the setting of a motion
picture starring Tom Cruise and Nicole Kidman. FAR AND AWAY (Universal Studios 1992).
234. See Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161–284 (1862) (repealed 1976); see also
Sheldon, supra note 232, at 9–10.
235. See Gregory A. Smith, The Role of Indian Tribes in the Section 106 National Historic
Preservation Act Review Process, SJ053 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 649, 678–79 (2004) (“Over the years, the
United States has advocated many policies, such as ‘Manifest Destiny’ or the distribution of ‘40
Acres and a Mule’ out West, which were widely lauded as beneficial to the Nation but which came
at the great expense of Indian tribes.”) (presentation before the Federal Communications
Commission in Washington, D.C.).
236. See BROWN, supra note 5, at 37.
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example, a common perception of mainstream American life includes
regular church attendance: Sunday or Saturday, as the case may be, tends
to be a special day of religious significance, separate and apart from the
rest of the “work” week. Likewise, in fiercely protecting religious
freedom, Americans have erected a “wall of separation” between church
and state. 237 Americans tend to divide life into the secular and the
nonsecular. Indians, however, do not necessarily distinguish religious
practice from cultural or political activity. 238 The traditional Indian
paradigm does not distinguish religious life; rather, it sees spirituality as
a unified part of their culture, their social and political order, and even
their existence. 239 In stark contrast, the “American” way of thinking
seems to categorize and compartmentalize; we draw boundaries and note
distinctions.
The difference in the perception of religion is a part of the problem,
and while Americans make categorical generalizations, much like the
author has just done, failure to recognize the multi-faceted character of
tribes by categorically defining them as merely religious, racial, or
political groups is shortsighted. In fact, such classification may become a
means of discrimination. As previously discussed, recent uses of the
political distinction have led to benefits to federally recognized tribes; 240
however, throughout history, this has not always been the case. Some of
the most horrifying acts committed against Indians were justified on the
basis of congressional power over Indians as a political class of
people. 241 Consider the many Indian wars waged, the denial of
citizenship to Indians until 1924, 242 the denial of the right to vote, and
the unilateral rewriting of treaties, to name a few. 243

237. See supra text accompanying note 24.
238. See Tamara Zentner, One Nation Under God: The Judeo/Christian Application of the
Free Exercise to Native American Religion 3–4 (Mar. 6, 1995) (unpublished thesis, Brigham Young
University) (in circulation at the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, Brigham Young University,
Provo, UT); see also Jemison, supra note 4.
239. See Jemison, supra note 4.
240. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding preferential treatment of
Indians based on political classification).
241. See generally Dussias, supra note 196 (chronicling the United States’ efforts to eradicate
or suppress Indian culture and religion).
242. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(2) (2000)).
243. See generally GETCHES, supra note 7, at 5, 84–85, 93–128, 199–216 (discussing federal
removal policies, termination, treaty abrogation, etc.).
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It is difficult to dispute that the political classification of tribes has
been a means of invidious discrimination. Clearly, tribes have been
subject to discrimination throughout history for racial, religious, and
political reasons. However, such discrimination and poor treatment,
while morally reprehensible, may not have been unlawful given the
courts’ interpretation of Congress’s plenary power. 244 Though some
might suggest that Congress could enact preferences for Indians based on
a desire to remedy past discrimination, providing a remedy where there
may be no legal wrong is problematic. Further, whether Congress can
properly act to remedy past lawful discrimination raises other issues
outside the scope of this Comment. However, once the rationale of
remedial power is adopted, then all discrimination, including Indian
preferences, may become suspect if such remedial measures are not
congruent and proportional to an identified past discrimination. 245 Even
if sustained as proper remedies for past discrimination, such treatment
would then be vulnerable to the same challenges as affirmative action. 246
As the understanding of tribal status and sovereignty evolves,
Congress should proceed with caution. Even though Congress generally
purports to act on Indians and Indian tribes by virtue of their political
status, Congress and the courts have employed a “degree of Indian
blood” test to determine the legitimacy of tribal membership. 247
Similarly, Indian tribes often determine their membership based on race
or blood-ties to the tribe. 248 As a result, even a neutral political
classification might ultimately turn on an assessment of race and/or
blood ties, and this blatant use of race/ethnic origin might implicate
greater constitutional protection.

244. See discussion on Congress’s plenary power over Indians, supra note 189.
245. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (indicating that remedial measures
under the Fourteenth Amendment must be proportional and congruent to the wrong that is sought to
be remedied). For example, Indian tax preferences have been enacted because of a desire to respect
sovereignty and not to remedy any past discriminatory tax practices. Such preferences may become
suspect precisely because they do remedy identified past discrimination.
246. See generally Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49
UCLA L. REV. 943, 959 (2002) (discussing the difference between Indian preferences and
affirmative action).
247. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223–27 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the
criteria for being a legal Indian).
248. Consider the Cherokee Tribe, which requires a “Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood
(CDIB), issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs” as a criteria for tribal membership. See The
Cherokee
Nation,
Tribal
Registration,
http://www.cherokee.org/Services/
TribalRegistration.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
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While these Indian preferences and other discriminatory practices are
currently justifiable on the basis of tribal status (political
classification), 249 the underlying legal basis is a two-edged sword.
Today, Congress uses the political classification to protect Indian
interests, 250 but the same unbounded power deemed nonjusticiable by
courts may, one day, once again be used as a justification to invidiously
discriminate against Indians. It is naïve, if not dangerous, to casually
characterize Indian tribes as political groups, without consideration of the
fact that they also represent racial and religious minorities.
Consequently, Congress and the courts must take special care in
exercising and reviewing congressional power: political classification is
a legitimate basis for distinction, but it must not become a surrogate
means of invidious racial or religious discrimination.
B. Avoiding Unconstitutional Government-Sponsored Discrimination
and Excessive Entanglement in Religion
Perhaps those challenging the Indian exemption to the BGEPA have
not been satisfied with the “political status” rationale because Congress
has drafted the exemption in terms of “religious purposes.” 251 Further, in
administering this religious exemption, Congress and the Department of
Interior have taken an intimate role in discerning whether a religious
ceremony warrants the issuance of an eagle permit. 252 To avoid actual or
perceived constitutional problems, Congress should adopt a revised
policy of arm’s length oversight of Indian cultural practice. First,
Congress should not unnecessarily define the exemption provided for
members of federally recognized Indian tribes as explicitly religious in
nature. Second, the administration of the BGEPA permit process should
be bifurcated, dividing authority between the Department of Interior and
the individual Indian tribes.
249. See Goldberg, supra note 246, at 959 (“Classifications based only on being an Indian,
however, are racial; discrimination against or preference for nontribal Indians—or even for tribal
Indians if the justification is their race and not their tribal status—would thus violate [antiaffirmative action and nondiscrimination laws].” (quoting Eugene Volokh, The California Civil
Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1358-59 (1997) (citations
omitted))).
250. The author does not purport to speak on the use of congressional power from the Indian
perspective. Indeed, there may be many Indians who do not believe that Congress is currently acting
in the best interest of the tribes.
251. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2000).
252. See generally 50 C.F.R. §§ 13.1 et seq. (2004) (outlining the process for acquiring an
eagle permit).
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1. Eliminating the Indian religious exemption in favor of a political
exemption
Imposing a “religious” classification on traditional Indian cultural
practices ignores the reality of Indian culture and is unnecessary; it
results only in concerns of improper governmental religious
entanglement and discrimination. Arguably, because religion is not a
distinct aspect of Indian culture, but permeates every aspect of Indian
life, any historic or cultural Indian practice could be classified as
religious, especially those that make use of eagle feathers or eagle parts.
However, the classification of these activities as “religious” is not an
Indian classification but an external imposition of an American social
construct. 253 Attempting to distinguish religious activities from other
Indian cultural observances is not only inaccurate but unnecessary.
Congress should create a more accurate and less problematic
classification for the purposes of describing an Indian exemption, such as
the religious exemption to the BGEPA, by expressly basing the
classification on the unique political status of Indian tribes and tying it to
historical and cultural practices as identified by the tribes.
Accordingly, Congress should amend the Bald and Gold Eagle
Protection Act to make an express declaration that bases the Indian
exemption on tribal political status and is for traditional tribal cultural
purposes. Congress might amend the text of 16 U.S.C. § 668a to read as
follows:
Whenever, after investigation, the Secretary of the Interior shall
determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle
or the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession, and transportation
of specimens thereof for the scientific or exhibition purposes of public
museums, scientific societies, and zoological parks, or for the
traditional cultural religious purposes of federally recognized Indian
tribes . . . .

While admittedly superficial, this change would avoid the dangers
arising from federal government involvement in religious establishment
resulting from the creation of so-called religious exemptions. 254
Particularly, this change would help resolve seeming inconsistent
application of the exemption to cases such as those in Hardman and
253. See discussion supra Part VII.A.4.
254. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three
Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 85–94, 104–119 (2000) (discussing problems in constitutional
doctrines providing religious exemptions).
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Antoine, where practitioners of the same religion received different
treatment because some were racially and politically Indians and others
were not. 255 Changing the exemption to one based expressly on political
status, such as whether an Indian is a member of a federally recognized
tribe, and, for the purpose of promoting Indian cultured as opposed to
religion, seems prudent and could eliminate many of the confusions and
contentions about the current exemption. 256
2. Ceding greater authority over eagle permits to tribes
A second modification to the eagle permitting process should
distance the federal government somewhat from the direct responsibility
to administer the issuance of eagle permits for Indian cultural purposes.
Currently, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service assesses each individual
application for an eagle permit on a set of criteria that includes,
“[w]hether the applicant is an Indian who is authorized to participate in
bona fide tribal religious ceremonies.” 257 Such criteria requires that the
federal government determine not only who is “authorized” to engage in
religious exercise but also which religious ceremonies are legitimate or
“bona fide.” This criteria seems improper and raises serious First
Amendment concerns. The process should be modified to remove the
federal government from being an arbiter of religious dogma. Instead, the
federal government should give tribes greater authority to make
decisions and establish criteria for granting permits to members of their
own tribes, especially on matters of cultural and religious practice. While
the Department of Interior should continue to play a central role in the
administration of the eagle permit process with regards to ensuring eagle
conservation, Indian tribes—particularly larger tribes—should be
delegated the authority to determine which traditional cultural practices
warrant the issue of an eagle permit. 258
To effect this change, the BGEPA and relevant federal rules should
be amended to limit initial application for eagle parts to recognized tribal
governments. That is, the tribe, as a political entity, should be the party
responsible to apply for eagle parts from the federal repository. After all,
255. See discussion supra Part VI.
256. Admittedly, this change might not help non-Indians or Indians who are not members of
any federally recognized tribe in securing exemption to the BGEPA, but this Comment does not
argue for such accommodation.
257. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2) (2004).
258. See generally De Meo, supra note 68 (arguing for reforms in the eagle permitting process
that would involve tribes at a greater level).
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if the rationale for the exemption is the unique political status of
federally recognized tribes, and if the established legal relationship is
between the federal government and the tribe, it is proper that the
transactions be government-to-government. Individual members of the
tribes would then apply to their own tribal government for approval of an
eagle permit. Individual applications to the federal government would
not be allowed, except under extenuating circumstances or as a means to
appeal a fundamentally unfair decision by a tribe.
In determining which tribal members should be granted permits for
eagle parts, tribes can establish criteria for granting eagle permits that
better account for tribal needs, interests, and particular cultural and
religious practices. Tribes can develop eligibility criteria that reflect
actual tribal membership, as determined by the tribe. They can further
determine for themselves what is or is not an appropriate use of eagle
parts based on their own traditional tribal practices and norms. 259
For large tribes with established governments, the administration of
the eagle permitting process within their tribe would not be burdensome
and would likely be a welcomed power. 260 For smaller tribes, there may
be need for continued federal administration. However, as smaller tribes
develop the ability to accommodate the increased responsibility, they,
along with the larger tribes, will greatly benefit. For example, under the
current system, there are concerns over an inefficient process that can
take years to produce eagle parts for what may be immediate needs. 261
By granting the power to administer the eagle permitting process to the
tribe, the tribe, as a community, could prioritize the use of the limited
supply of eagle parts among its members. This could speed up the
process for the most pressing cases, and in any event, would place the
burden on the tribe to discern which applications merit expedited
consideration. To protect against arbitrary or fundamentally unfair
decisions by tribes on individual applications for eagle permits, the
federal government, through the Department of Interior and Bureau of

259. Not all tribes use eagle parts in the same way or in the same frequency, but a majority of
tribes place some significance on the use of eagle parts. See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
260. Many tribes are working to strengthen their tribal governments and to become more
effective. See, e.g., Eric Lemont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 34 (2003–04) (describing
the experience of the Cherokee in adopting a new constitution and concluding that American Indian
nations are “engaged in a process of creating more effective and legitimate constitutions”).
261. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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Indian Affairs, could provide an avenue for appeal from decisions of
individual tribes.
By putting the decision into the realm of tribal lawmakers, tribes
would be further empowered to oversee and regulate the use of eagle
parts; the tribe, and not the ominous federal government, would have
primary responsibility for authorizing and distributing the eagle parts
among its members. Tribal enforcement would likely be especially
effective because tribes have unique and vested interests in both
preserving eagle populations and preserving their own cultural and
religious practices.
While ceding greater power to the tribes, the federal government can
maintain general oversight over the issuance of eagle permits. First, the
method of physically collecting and distributing eagle parts to bona fide
permit holders need not change. The National Eagle Repository could
continue to ship eagle parts to the applicants after tribal approval or after
successful appeal to the Department of Interior. The Department of
Interior could continue to set limits on the total number of permits that
can be issued by allocating available permits among the recognized
tribes, and by providing other guidelines for continued enforcement of
the permitting scheme. These changes would allow the federal
government to continue to protect and conserve eagle populations while
meeting its federal treaty and trust obligations to preserve Indian cultural
practices. Amending the eagle permitting process in this way would give
Indian tribes greater control over their own cultural and religious
practices and would be consistent with the federal government’s policy
of Indian self-determination. 262
The shift of authority would also diminish concerns over excessive
government entanglement in religion, religious discrimination, and racial
discrimination (in the form of discrimination against non-Indians seeking
the benefit of the exemption) because it would leave the power to grant

262. “Beginning in the 1960s, the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the federal
government each recognized, at least to some extent, the rights of self-determination with respect to
Indian affairs.” Jeremy R. Fitzpatrick, Note, The Competent Ward, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 189, 192
(2003–04); see also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
§§ 102–104, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000) et seq.) (showing Congress’s
desire to promote Indian self-determination by ceding greater governmental powers to the tribes,
such as education and other services); Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 461 et seq.); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992) (referring to the federal policy of tribal self-determination and
self-governance which was in force before the Dawes Act, and which was again adopted after
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934).
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or deny permit applications with the tribes. In this sense, the tribes are
also uniquely qualified to administer the permits pursuant to the BGEPA
exemption because they are not subject to the same constitutional
limitations imposed on Congress by the Bill of Rights. 263
Of course, religious considerations are not the underlying motivation
for the BGEPA and the permitting process; rather, the motivation is the
government’s interest in eagle conservation balanced with its treaty and
trust obligations to the tribes. But if the principal goal of the BGEPA is
truly to conserve eagle populations, and not to determine the validity of
individual tribal religious and cultural practices, then giving tribes
greater authority presents no danger to eagles. Giving tribes power to
grant or deny applications for eagle permits from their members would
be merely an exercise of sovereign tribal power over members of
federally recognized tribes. So long as it is administered within limits
established as a part of a neutral conservation plan, and, so long as eagle
parts continue to come solely from those annually collected and
distributed from the federal eagle repositories, there will be no adverse
effect on eagles.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to bring form to a complicated and
controversial issue. To many Americans, the controversy surrounding the
use of eagle feathers may seem unimportant, or even petty. However, the
use of eagles and eagle parts in Native American cultural and religious
practices is central to their faith, identity, and way of life. It also touches
on foundational elements of American law: freedom of religion, equal
protection, due process, and historic treaty obligations. The federal
government has plenary power over Indian tribes and, because of the
tribes’ political status, is justified in providing an exemption from the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act for Indian purposes. Yet, rational
concerns over excessive entanglement in religion and perceived racial
and religious discrimination may ultimately jeopardize the important
tribal interests. As recent cases like Hardman and Antoine suggest, when
Congress words the ostensibly political exemption in terms of religion

263. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–85 (1896) (holding that the Bill of Rights,
specifically the Fifth Amendment, did not apply to Indian Tribes). But see Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 73, 77–81 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301–1303, 1321–1326, 1331, 1341 (2000)) (imposing certain restrictions on Indian Tribes that
resemble many of the constitutional limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights).
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and when the application of the exemption has such strong racial
implications, it raises serious concerns of violations of the Free Exercise,
Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.
While the government’s interest in protecting eagles may continue to
be compelling, challenges to the BGEPA and the Indian religious
exemption will continue as the permitting scheme increasingly appears to
be not-so-narrowly tailored. As eagle populations increase, it will
become harder to justify denying a religious exemption to non-Indian
practitioners of the Native American religion. It will also be more
difficult to justify denying the exemption to practitioners who are racially
Indian, but whose tribes are not blessed with federal recognition. If the
Indian exemption continues to be seen as a religious exemption that
applies only to people who are both racially Indian and politically
members of federally recognized tribes, the controversy will continue.
Assuming that species conservation remains compelling, Congress
may need to fashion an approach that focuses on the political status of
tribes and which emphasizes that the Indian exemption is for political
and cultural and not necessarily religious purposes. The permitting
process should also recognize the sovereignty and capabilities of
federally recognized tribes by giving them direct oversight of the
administration of the eagle permit program for their respective tribes. As
individual members apply to their respective tribes, the tribe can
prioritize the use of eagles, eagle feathers, and other eagle parts, giving
special consideration to immediate needs and planning to make the best
use of an extremely limited resource. The federal government can and
should set guidelines and limits on the total number of permits to ensure
maintenance of conservation efforts but can also avoid what many
consider an excessive entanglement in religion. 264
Most importantly, ceding (or re-ceding) this authority will further
what most tribes and Native Americans seek: “a relationship to the
[federal] government that will give them, as a group, political, economic,
and socio-cultural equality with the rest of . . . society while allowing
them to retain their identity as Indians.” 265 And just as important, the
desire to retain a tribal identity is not sought as a “privilege bestowed by
264. See generally De Meo, supra note 68 (arguing for reforms in the eagle permitting process
that would involve tribes at a greater level).
265. Elizabeth A. Pearce, Self-Determination for Native Americans: Land Rights and the
Utility of Domestic and International Law, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 361, 384 (1991)
(alteration in original) (quoting PATHWAYS TO SELF-DETERMINATION: CANADIAN INDIANS AND THE
CANADIAN STATE xvii (L. Little Bear, M. Boldt & J. Long eds., 1984)).
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a benevolent [federal] government, nor as a concession from a
fashionably liberal society” but rather as an “inherent right.” 266 So, to
many it may be just a feather; but to Indian tribes and to the federal
government, it embodies a weighty constitutional question with
important implications on a historic struggle for faith, cultural identity,
and tribal sovereignty.
James R. Dalton ∗

266. Id.
∗ The author wishes to thank Dean Kevin Worthen (J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University) for his guidance and direction in the research underlying this comment. Also, the
author wishes to acknowledge the support of his wife, Jill, and his children, Kaylee and Tessa,
without whom this piece could not have been completed.
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